09NBDAR1

```
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
1
     SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
     -----x
 2
 3
     UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
 4
                                             23 Cr. 134 (VSB)
                V.
5
     CALVIN DARDEN, JR.,
6
                                             Trial
                    Defendant.
 7
       -----X
 8
                                             New York, N.Y.
9
                                             September 23, 2024
                                             9:30 a.m.
10
     Before:
11
12
                        HON. VERNON S. BRODERICK,
13
                                             District Judge
                                             -and Jury-
14
                               APPEARANCES
15
     DAMIAN WILLIAMS
          United States Attorney for the
          Southern District of New York
16
     KEVIN MEAD
17
     STEPHEN J. RITCHIN
     WILLIAM C. KINDER
     BRANDON C. THOMPSON
18
          Assistant United States Attorneys
19
     DONALDSON CHILLIEST & MCDANIEL LLP
20
     BY: XAVIER R. DONALDSON
          -and-
21
     ANTHONY RICCO
     STEVEN Z. LEGON
22
     ERICA A. REED
          Attorneys for Defendant
23
     Also Present:
24
     Alexander Ross, Paralegal
     Arjun Ahuja, Paralegal
25
     Melissa Baccari, FBI Special Agent
```

THE COURT: Okay. I apologize for the delay, both ways. So I am testing negative. I will wear my mask during the trial and when we're questioning the jurors, especially when we're doing sidebar. So the way I intend to proceed, all of the jurors are going to be over across the way in 519. The 55 plus the 30, whatever new folks. Once we're done here, my intention is to bring over the 55 or so who have been with us already who had heard my initial comments, and several of whom had already been questioned. Once they're here, my initial question for all of them, the full panel is — and I was planning on combining it, but I'll hear from the parties also, whether or not any of the prospective jurors have done any research or spoken substantively about the case. And I'll just ask them to raise their hands.

If they do, it wasn't my plan to engage in any questioning, any back and forth. My thought was that those jurors would just be excused, but obviously I'll hear from the parties. I mean the two questions are slightly different, so let me hear first from the government and then from the defense.

MR. MEAD: Your Honor, I think that approach makes sense. I think I would not say in advance that you're going to dismiss any jurors on that basis because I think that would encourage them.

THE COURT: All I intend to do is ask those questions,

ask them to raise their hands, and then basically ask them to get up and say they're excused.

MR. MEAD: That makes sense, your Honor.

MR. DONALDSON: Just so I'm clear, so we're asking the ones that were previously here whether they've done any research related to this case?

THE COURT: Correct, and substantive, any substantive conversations relating to this case.

MR. DONALDSON: Do we need to ask the question related to Dancing with the Stars since it has been on?

THE COURT: My view of that is that I don't -although I'm going to tell them not to, if they have started
watching and not to watch it, what would be the prejudice if
they've watched Dancing With the Stars and seen a witness in
Dancing With the Stars? Wouldn't it be the same as if someone
is just still playing professional basketball? In other words,
I'm not sure I'm going to excuse any jurors; A, because I don't
believe I told them not to watch Dancing With the Stars; but,
B, that question is or that issue is slightly less -- well, I
don't see it as directly related to the case as the other two
questions.

MR. DONALDSON: I respectfully disagree. I think that with media now, particularly social media, general media, et cetera, the goal is to cast certain persons in certain lights when they're on media or on social media. So if he's

being marketed on Dancing With the Stars and even watching him on Dancing With the Stars, then they may be getting some information or different things about him that they wouldn't otherwise know if it was a regular witness.

In most cases when we have jury selection or trials we tell the jurors not to, of course do any research, but also not to do anything about any particular witness, particularly material witnesses. So because of the nature of this case and the nature of that witness and his personality, et cetera, I would not want them looking at or watching anything related to Dwight Howard because I believe that, as he's being marketed on Dancing With the Stars, et cetera, they're trying to promote a certain image that may not be the right image for entertainment purposes. And I believe that kind of promotion, marketing et cetera may some how affect the jury related to his testimony. So I respectfully disagree with the Court, but I think that should be discussed as well.

THE COURT: Okay. I'll hear from the government.

MR. MEAD: Your Honor, this has already -- we agree with the Court. We don't think that needs to be a threshold question here. It's already the question that the Court is planning to ask in part two once the panel has been qualified. I did not watch Dancing With the Stars. It sounds like there was nothing about this case. If there was, I assume defense would have said something. And of course if defense wants to

strike anyone who watched the show, the Court will be able to inquire about that later on. We don't need to do it now as this kind of very brief threshold exercise.

THE COURT: All right. As I mention, I don't think that, quite frankly, I was in any way required to ask a question about Dancing With the Stars. The parties agree that I should and I will, but I don't believe that it is a question that preliminary — I'm not going to ask the 55 that come back whether or not they watched Dancing With the Stars initially, but I will do so in due course as we've discussed and as are part of the questions. Yes.

MR. DONALDSON: There's one other matter. I sent a — it may have been my confusion last Tuesday, but as I said via email, my belief last Tuesday when we left was that the Court had dismissed those jurors and that they were not to return. Because of that, the government and I had conversations related to a particular juror, Mr. Letterman, and we talked about my son's interaction with Mr. Letterman. We even talked about whether or not either one of us would have picked him. It's my belief that those jurors have been discharged last Tuesday.

After court on Tuesday as I was walking away from the building, Mr. Letterman was walking towards me. I introduced myself. He recalled that he spoke to my son. We shook hands and then we left. It was my understanding that he would not be coming back today, but he is downstairs or he is in room 519.

09NBDAR1

So just to put that on the record, he's here, and that was my interaction with him last week.

THE COURT: Okay. Any objection having my deputy clerk indicate to Mr. Letterman that he can head back across the street?

MR. MEAD: No objection, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. We'll do that. Obviously I was unaware of any interaction with any members of the panel until now. I didn't know that your son had interacted with Mr. Letterman. Obviously it's a very unique situation, and I wasn't planning — and none of us were planning on these jurors coming back. It just by happenstance that we were able to do that. So we'll excuse Mr. Letterman from being a juror in this case, and I'll do that at the outset before bringing the 55 folks over here. Okay.

Let me ask, is there anything else? I obviously have to deal with the motion in limine and the most recent letter from the defense, but let me hear from the government concerning whether there's anything else that we need to discuss before that?

MR. MEAD: I think some brief things, your Honor.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. MEAD: One, AUSA Thompson had a very brief interaction with one of the jurors this morning I think not recognizes that that person was a juror. Maybe Mr. Thompson if

you would just give 30 seconds on that.

MR. THOMPSON: Your Honor, I was waiting for the elevator to come to the courtroom and an individual who I thought was a court reporter given that she had a headset asked if this elevator went to five as she was looking for 519. I said any of these elevators does go to the fifth floor, and then we rode the elevator together. I think in that brief exchange that was about 12 seconds she said she was looking for Judge Broderick.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Yes.

MR. MEAD: On the voir dire. Right before lunch last week we pointed out to the Court that I think Docusign the company was not listed on the voir dire sheets, and perhaps the Court could orally add it when it ask the question.

THE COURT: I will do so. And with regard to the interaction, I'll hear from the defense in a moment, but go ahead. So Docusign. Yes. Mr. Mead.

MR. MEAD: The sealed motion is still pending as the Court mentioned. I think that has some interaction with the defendant's request for voir dire this morning of course. I don't know if the Court wants to take that up now.

THE COURT: Why don't we talk about the additional voir dire, and then we could more fend to the next issue. Yes.

MR. DONALDSON: Your Honor, you pointed us to respond to their interaction. We don't have a or see a problem with

that interaction. And just for the clarity and for equity, I guess I was standing out in the hallway this morning listening to my earphones, and I don't know maybe eight or nine people asked me where room 519 was, and so I pointed to that area. So thank you, sir, for telling us that.

THE COURT: Thank you. With regard to both interactions, I agree that nothing needs to be done with regard to that. All right. With regard to the letter that was sent earlier today with regard to the additional voir dire questions I think related to aiding and abetting. And the one that's related to the sealed motion, let me ask the defense is there anything else that you would want to add to that isn't in the letter that you submitted?

MR. DONALDSON: You're speaking about the one this morning?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. DONALDSON: No, nothing more to that one.

THE COURT: Let me hear from the government with regard to that.

MR. MEAD: As to the first voir dire request aiding and abetting liability, the government's not planning to introduce the judgment against Mr. Briscoe. I'm not sure if the defense is. If the defense is, I think we'd like a proffer of relevance. We still haven't gotten an exhibit list from the defense, so this is all news to us. If that document were to

09NBDAR1

come in, I think we generally don't object to something like this in the voir dire.

THE COURT: All right. What I'll say with regard to that is that the issue of aiding and abetting, to the extent it's relevant, will be something that I can discuss with the jury in the request to charge. It's not clear to me -- again -- well, let me ask, Mr. Donaldson, does the defense intend to offer Mr. Briscoe's guilty plea or something like that? And if so, what is the relevance of that?

MR. RICCO: Judge, I'll respond.

THE COURT: Yes, Mr. Ricco.

MR. RICCO: Your Honor, the issue of his conviction is not just limited to the entry of a judgment, he's on the various witnesses list. Well, he's on the defense witness list, or he will be if he's not. So there's a possibility that he may testify in this case, and so --

THE COURT: Have you spoken with his lawyer?

MR. RICCO: The defense has spoken with --

THE COURT: Did I sentence Mr. Briscoe? I just don't remember.

MR. RICCO: Yes, according to the docket sheet anyway. So anyway, Judge, it's for precautionary reasons. I think the more critical issue is if and when he comes in there's some type of curative instruction. That's the most important part.

THE COURT: I think, again, it's premature. Number

one, I do have a witness list. He's not yet on that list. I understand he's going to be on that list. I think that if he does end up testifying, that's a separate issue. And I think obviously the aiding and abetting liability and the issue of his guilty plea we can talk about and at that time. But as things stand right now, I don't intend to ask the jury or provide them with an instruction with regard to aiding and abetting at this juncture. Okay.

Is there anything else that the parties wish to add to the arguments? Understanding the nature of the filings that both parties put in, is there anything the parties would like to add with regard to the motion in limine that remains outstanding with regard to athlete-one, excuse me athlete-two?

MR. MEAD: The only things I'll say, your Honor, is we submitted a letter to the Court on Saturday night with an updated set of exhibits. I think the law was incredibly clear that we should — the exhibit shouldn't be — you know — the text we're trying to — shouldn't come in even before we submitted that letter. I think given the dramatically narrowed scope of the messages we are planning to introduce, almost all of the statements by athlete—two are for questions that we're planning to introduce. And we're open to a limiting instruction that they're not being offered for their truth. I think this is — there's clear Second Circuit law saying that messages we're trying to preclude don't come in. And I think

it would turn the trial into a bit of a circus if they were to come in. I'm happy to answer any other questions from the Court, otherwise we'll rest on our submission.

THE COURT: Mr. Donaldson.

MR. DONALDSON: Judge, notwithstanding the government's second letter related to this particular witness's -- I'm going to call them communications. And it doesn't matter in my opinion whether or not they are questions, statements, abbreviations, anecdotes. It doesn't matter. In my humble opinion as the government said, the Second Circuit is crystal clear related to persons who have, quote, unquote, would be testifying that have extreme views on race, and in this particular case this witness has extreme -- and I'm saying super extreme views. Let me take it back. This witness has indicated that he is a devout racist in my opinion. He has indicated that by his text messages --

THE COURT: Could you do me a favor. The filings have been made.

MR. DONALDSON: Sorry, Judge. Pardon me. In my opinion the witness has indicated certain views. We would — it's our belief that those views are of a nature that require the responses that I put in my motion in limine. I think that notwithstanding the limited nature of the government's letter realistically — and I think that's what I'm basing this on, realistically the jury will have to put some type of

credibility, some type of emphasis, some type of something on those statements, those questions. Inside the questions, the context of those questions do specifically relate to material issues in this case. The answers to those questions — and likely, if I can go a step forward, like we say generally, questions and answers is what is evidence, so.

THE COURT: The answer is evidence.

MR. DONALDSON: The answer is evidence. So in this particular situation if the witness is asked a question and there's an answer given, then I imagine the government's going to use that answer as part of the evidence to accomplish a particular goal that they're seeking. In my opinion it's a sandwich now. One, the answer not relevant without the question, which means the jurors are going to have to put some, in my opinion, some weight on the question and where the question came from. Just because of the nature of the information contained in my motion in limine — forgive me for my initial statements.

THE COURT: It's okay.

MR. DONALDSON: I firmly believe that the jury should be allowed to hear the contents of my motion in limine to properly judge the nature of the question and answer that were equal evidence that they will be asked to decide whether it's credible. And again, just my experience in doing several of these fraud cases in this district and other districts, I am

confident that at the end of this case the prosecutor is going to do what they do well, which is try to add things up, this plus this equals that. This person said this equals that. We know this happened, this happened, so this must be what it is. That's going to happen, which means they're going to use those text messages to do that and to satisfy their requirement for meeting certain elements. That means they're going to be asking the jury to, again, come to some kind of decision related to those questions and those answers. So with that I'll rely on my record and my papers, but I want to make sure I reinforce that.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. DONALDSON: Once again I'm sorry for the first part.

THE COURT: That's okay. Anything else from the government?

MR. MEAD: Not unless the Court has questions, your Honor.

THE COURT: Now I'll address the government's outstanding motions in limine. First, the government filed a motion on September 5, 2024, to preclude cross-examination of athlete-three and athlete-three's mother regarding athlete-three's 2019 NCAA suspension, as well as any other evidence regarding that suspension and the circumstances that led to that suspension.

Second, the government filed a sealed motion on September 12, 2024, to preclude defendant from introducing certain text messages sent and received by athlete-one, a victim in this case who the government does not intend to call to testify. I think I misspoke. I think the outstanding motion is athlete-one. I apologize, a victim in this case who the government does not intend to call to testify. Third, the government filed a sealed motion on September 16 to preclude cross-examination of or to the introduction of evidence regarding certain categories of evidence regarding athlete-two, another victim in this case.

By letter dated September 21, defendant informed me that he is not objecting to the government's September 5th or September 16th motions in limine; therefore, those motions are granted as moot, and defendant is precluded from cross-examining athlete-three and athlete-three's mother regarding the matters identified in the government's September 5th letter, and athlete-two about the matters identified in the government's September 16th letter. In its September 12, 2024 motion in limine, the government argues that since it does not intend to call athlete-one, I should exclude certain text messages sent and received by athlete-one. In addition, the government indicates that it intends to introduce text messages between athlete-one and Charles Briscoe, a co-conspirator, but that it does not intend to introduce any of athlete-one's

out-of-court statements for their truth; and that it consents to a limiting instruction making clear that none of athlete-one's statements are being admitted for their truth.

The government filed its -- excuse me. The defendant filed its opposition on September 18, 2024, and the government filed its reply on September 19. By sealed letter dated September 21, the government provided me with the exhibits it intends to offer at trial which consist of five text chains between athlete-one and Briscoe, two of which only include text messages sent from Briscoe to athlete-one.

Defendant opposes the government's motion on two grounds. First, defendant argues that "it does not matter that athlete-one is now not testifying, and as such not subject to cross-examination" because "the government is still attempting to use the words of an individual that undeniably harbors bias to assist in convicting defendant; and therefore, he should be able to impeach athlete-one with his prior text messages."

Second, defendant argues that Rule 106 of the Federal Rules of Evidence requires the admission of the text messages in order to establish the "full context of possible bias" of athlete-one. Having considered the parties' submission and the universe of text messages sent by athlete-one the government intends to admit at trial, I find that the text messages that are the subject of the motion in limine have no probative value, and are thus inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence

402. Therefore, the government's motion to preclude those text messages is granted.

With regard to impeachment of a non-testifying witness. As an initial matter I find that if athlete-one does not testify, and if none of his statements are admitted for the truth of the matter asserted, then those statements are not hearsay, and defendant will not be permitted to impeach athlete-one's credibility. Federal Rule of Evidence 806 establishes the basis on which a non-testifying witness may be impeached. Under that rule "when a hearsay statement has been admitted in evidence, the credibility of the declarant may be attached by any evidence which would be admissible for those purposes if the declarant had testified as a witness. The advisory committee note explain that "the declarant of a hearsay statement which is admitted in evidence is in effect a witness" and that therefore "his credibility should in fairness be subject to impeachment as though he had in fact testified."

Here, defendant argues that it "does not matter that athlete-one is now not testifying, and as such not subject to cross examination" because the jury must be informed of athlete-one's bias text to assess the "weight or veracity of the statements and for completeness." This argument is contrary to law and ignores the fact that because none of athlete-one's statements are being offered for their truth, his credibility is not at issue. Thus, the jury need not consider the veracity

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

of any of athlete-one's statements since they are not being admitted for their truth, and any impeachment evidence is not admissible. And I'm citing *United States v. Menendez* there, 2024 WL 2867107 at 1, and also cite which cites *United States v. Paulino*, 445 F.3d 2011 at 2017.

The fact that athlete-one is a victim, and therefore a "critical" witness does not alter my analysis or render the text message at issue admissible. As the Second Circuit has "previously made clear that a district court need not allow impeachment even of a central figure whose out-of-court-statement were not admitted for their truth." Citing United States v. Reagan there, 103 F.3d 1072 at 1083. In addition, defendant also argues that "the government is attempting to use athlete-one's text messages for their truth and disguising it as context." Assuming the text messages sent by athlete-one would serve as critical evidence if the government were to ignore -- excuse me, if the jury were to ignore my instruction and consider such statements not as context for Briscoe's text messages, but rather for their truth, then perhaps there might be some marginal probative value to athlete-one's credibility.

However, defendant has failed to highlight even a single text message raising this concern. Instead, defendant highlights two exchanges between athlete-one and Briscoe that it contends are "good examples" of the government's purported

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

attempt to introduce athlete-one's statement for their truth. These exchanges, however, one of which the government no longer seeks to admit, do not illustrate or support defendant's Each of the four purportedly hearsay statement by athlete-one are questions, not affirmative statement. The law is clear that questions are not assertions, and I'm citing United States v. Coplan, 703 F.3d 46 at 84, as well as Headley v. Tilghman, 53 F.3d 472 at 476. Defendant failed to explain why athlete-one's questions are affirmative statements, or how his questions contain facts. Thus, I do not credit defendant's argument that these exchanges reflect athlete-one "identifying people and discussing alleged facts related to material issues." Let alone defendant's suggestion that the government is "disquising" athlete-one's statement as context in an attempt to invite the jury to consider the text for their truth.

To the contrary, athlete-one's non-hearsay questions involve precisely the intended use proffered by the government context for Briscoe's statement, which are factual assertions that are admissible for their truth as co-conspirator statement. Indeed of the ten statements that the government seeks to admit, seven are questions, and three are statements that are plainly not being admitted for their truth. Thus, because defendant fails to support this argument that athlete-one's statements are factual assertions that are being

offered for their truth, athlete-one's credibility is not at issue. Rule 806 does not apply, and defendant will not be permitted to impeach athlete-one on this basis. With regard to the Rule of Completeness under Rule 106. Defendant also argues that if the government is permitted to introduce text messages between athlete-one and Briscoe, the admission of which defendant has not objected to, that the text messages that are the subject of the government's motion in limine should be admitted pursuant to Rule of Completeness under Federal Rule of Evidence 106.

This argument is similarly unavailing. Under the Rule of Completeness "if a party introduces all or part of a writing or recorded statement, an adverse party may require the introduction at that time of any other part or any other writing or recorded statement that in fairness ought to be considered at the same time." I'm citing there Rule 106. The Second Circuit has interpreted the doctrine of completeness to "require that a statement be admitted in its entirety when this is necessary to explain the admitted portion, to place it in context, or to avoid misleading the trier of fact, or to ensure a fair and impartial understanding of the admitted portion."

I'm citing United States v. Marin, 669 F.2d 73 at 84. This is true "even though a statement may be hearsay." And I'm citing Coplan, 703 F.3d 46 at 85.

Defendant does not identify nor have I located any

case in which a court permitted impeachment material of a non-testifying witness under any rule, let alone Rule 106. Nor has the defendant cited any case law where a court has allowed the introduction of entirely separate statements on a different subject matter to provide context to an admitted statement. I decline to do so here. In addition, Rule 106 "does not render admissible evidence that is otherwise inadmissible." I'm citing United States v. Elmanni, 2023 WL 2770242 at 7. Nor does Rule 106 "compel admission of otherwise inadmissible hearsay evidence." I'm citing United States v. Gotti, 457 F. Supp. 2d 395 at 3697 or function as "a mechanism to bye pass hearsay rules of any self-serving testimony" and I'm citing United States V. Gonzalez, 399 F. App. 641 at 645.

Here, of course, defendant does not intend to introduce self-serving testimony, but the same general principle applies. Defendant may not use the rule to introduce evidence that is advantageous though otherwise admissible hearsay. To be clear, the fact of the text messages are hearsay is not sufficient to defeat defendant's Rule 106. As the Second Circuit recently explained "when the omitted portion of a statement is properly introduced to correct a misleading impression or place in context that portion already admitted, it is for this very reason admissible for a valid non-hearsay purpose to explain and ensure the fair understanding of the evidence that has been already introduced." And I'm citing

09NBDAR1

United States v. Williams, 930 F.3d 44 at 60. However, as Williams also clarified, and as defendant himself acknowledges in citing Williams, the completeness doctrine "has never required the admission of portions of a statement that are neither explanatory of nor relevant to the admitted passages." Defendant has not proffered any reason why the text messages are relevant to explain or correct a misleading impression regarding the text messages sent and received by athlete-one that the government seeks to admit.

Lastly, defendant argues that given athlete-one clear bias it is "reasonable that athlete-one might have distorted or fabricated his words against defendant." It is worth noting, however, that it appears that athlete-one did not know relevant details about the defendant at the time many of the text messages were sent and/or received. And defendant has not provided any evidence otherwise. In addition, defendant does not identify any facts or words he believes were "distorted or fabricated" in the text messages the government seeks to admit. Therefore, the text messages that are the subject of the motion in limine are not admissible pursuant to Rule 106.

Now, the issue about what those text messages concerned and the severity of the bias, I need not address, and they don't impact my decision here as the law is clear.

Accordingly, the government's motion is granted. Okay. Any questions from the government?

MR. MEAD: The accidental reference by defense counsel, we'd asked that that either be stricken from the transcript or sealed, whatever is most convenient.

MR. DONALDSON: I would ask that it be stricken. I agree.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. DONALDSON: I was going to ask that it either be stricken or sealed, whatever is easier for the reporter or the Court.

THE COURT: All right. What may need to happen though is the parties, I don't think the court reporter is in a position to figure out what statement should be stricken. I have no objection to the statements being stricken. In fact, the defense is in agreement, so I just ask the parties when you get the draft of the transcript, please communicate with the court reporter to make sure that those statements are stricken. Yes, Mr. Donaldson.

MR. DONALDSON: One last thing. I'm going to hand the government a subpoena for Mr. Parsons.

THE COURT: Well, let me ask. It's not clear to me.

Is it your belief, Mr. Donaldson, that Mr. Parsons is under the government's control?

MR. DONALDSON: It's my belief that the government has been in contact with Mr. Parsons. The short answer to that question is yes. The long answer to that question is my belief

| O9NBDAR1

is that Mr. Parsons not in New York City. The government has been in contact with Mr. Parsons over the last three weeks either it's been in person and/or via phone and/or via video. I think it's a professional courtesy, as we always do and always and sometimes provide the government with a subpoena for a witness that they had initially were going to call that we're now letting them know that we'd like to call, consider calling.

THE COURT: I understand Mr. Parsons is represented is. That correct, Mr. Mead.

MR. MEAD: It is, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. So Mr. Mead can provide the subpoena to the attorney, and we will see what happens thereafter. I'm not sure that -- it's not clear to me that quite frankly, Mr. Donaldson, that the witness is under the control of the government. It's not a government witness. It's someone, yes, who's a victim. If you can cite me case law that a victim is in fact under the control of the government such that the government is otherwise -- well, so it's not clear to me that that is in fact the case. So the government can provide -- have you been in contact with the lawyer?

MR. DONALDSON: Judge, no, honestly. This is, as the Court can see, this is involving a rather fluid situation. This is no difference from the government providing us a subpoena for someone that they thought we were, whatever. And so I think it's appropriate that as a professional courtesy we

09NBDAR1

provide them with a subpoena and ask them to give it to Mr. Parsons' attorney. They can give me Mr. Parsons' attorney's information, and I'll do the same thing. But the goal is to make sure he gets this and that we can try to get him. That's the goal. The goal is to make sure he gets it and we can get him here. They want to say he's not under their control, that's their position.

THE COURT: It's not a question of position. All right. It's a question of law. So it is their position. And that's all I was saying is, it's not clear to me that he's under their control. No one has cited me any case law with regard to that. Now with regard to any expected testimony that Mr. Parsons may give, I may require some proffer as to that because we're not necessarily going to call him. And he won't necessarily be a witness merely to elicit the bias which I have just excluded.

MR. DONALDSON: I will not do that, Judge.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. DONALDSON: I will not do that, Judge.

THE COURT: Okay. But, well, all right. Yes,

Mr. Mead.

MR. MEAD: So our position is he's not under our control. I will happily provide defense counsel with the contact information for the attorney. I will certainly do that, but I don't think the subpoena is binding on us in any

way. I share the concerns just raised by the Court. I think there may need to be briefing on that subject. It seems relatively significant to the government. I don't think we necessarily need to deal with that today of course. This is the second reference just this morning to kind of new defense witnesses. There's a reference to Mr. Briscoe. There's a reference to Mr. Parsons. They haven't been on the defense witness list. We still haven't gotten any 26.2 material.

We've learned that the judgment for Mr. Briscoe might be coming in based on a voir dire question. We'd ask again that the Court direct the defense to provide us an updated witness list, 26.2 material and an exhibit list, some sort of very soon deadline, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. RICCO: Your Honor, we have no objection to the Court suggesting that to us. This is a defense. The defense is fluid. The government hasn't put one witness on the witness stand yet, and we're doing the best we can to comply with fairness.

THE COURT: Let's get the trial underway and I'll take an assessment concerning that. With regard to witnesses.

Obviously the ruling on Mr. Parsons was just today; however, it clearly was anticipated that the defense wanted him as a witness, and thus a subpoena was provided to the government today. So I understand that the defense is doing as best they

can, but what I would say is that as soon as -- I'm not exactly sure what happened with Mr. Briscoe, but let me ask. Are there any additional witnesses other than the witnesses that have been discussed, the three, Mr. Briscoe and now Mr. Parsons that the defense intends to call in its case? Yes.

MR. DONALDSON: Judge, we're not in a position to say that we are not. We're trying to be as fair as we can. We provided the witnesses that we've thought about at that time. As I said, this is a fluid situation. The last one regarding the last witness was related to what just happen. So as we — something comes up, then I will immediately tell the government. I think Mr. Mead will agree that I've been trying to as fair as possible. If something comes up, I'll tell him quickly.

THE COURT: Sure. I guess what I would say then with regard to the witnesses currently that have been identified, particularly Mr. Briscoe, if there are documents like whether it's a plea allocution, his guilty plea, whatever it may be that the defense intends to introduce, I would ask that you provide notice to the government by the close of business tomorrow with regard to Mr. Briscoe. I mean, in other words, there are certain documents — there may be certain documents you're not sure about; but with regard to any documents relating to his guilty plea, his sentencing, whatever, whatever you intend to use with him, I'd ask that you provide the

government with that information.

MR. DONALDSON: Certainly, Judge. Absolutely.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Let me ask, is there anything else that we need to deal with, cause the next thing I was planning on doing is Ms. Disla would go across the way, let Mr. Letterman know that he is excused and bring however many of the 55 folks over here. In a moment I'll check to see whether we can position them where they were when we were doing jury selection in 110.

MR. DONALDSON: That was the question we had this morning with the government whether or not we were going to try to have those same two, three, in the same places.

THE COURT: That would be my intent, but I have to check with my staff to see if that's possible. We can take a break. Yes, Mr. Mead.

MR. MEAD: Just a couple of quick things. One is, it's my understanding that the Court is not going to read the second proposed voir dire question based on the Court's ruling on the sealed motion in limine?

THE COURT: That's correct, yes. Sorry.

MR. MEAD: Not a problem. Your Honor, we previously discussed a protective order that there's going to be a lot of PII that is necessary to distinguish the defendant from his father in this case. There's a protective order that's been agreed upon between the parties. So if the press asked for

exhibits, some of that PII will be redacted. We can hand that up to the Court's deputy law clerk.

THE COURT: Okay. And is this something -- the parties are in agreement. I will sign and it will be placed on the docket.

MR. DONALDSON: Yes.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. MEAD: And then finally just for the Court's reference, there are a substantial number of documents that we intend to move into evidence tomorrow at some point. We have submitted that list of documents of exhibits to the defense by email last night. It is our hope of course that the defense will let us know any objections to any of those exhibits so that we don't get bogged down tomorrow when we're trying to introduce them.

THE COURT: Okay. I'm not sure they're going to be any objections, but if I could just get a copy of whatever the list of those documents are. Yes, Mr. Donaldson.

MR. DONALDSON: I'm sorry. I forgot what I was responding to.

THE COURT: Mention of exhibits.

MR. DONALDSON: You don't know whether there was going to be an objection to those. We did receive that email, the email was sent this morning about 1:00, so actually I didn't see it until just now. And there are maybe three or four dozen

exhibits here, so I don't know right now whether we will be objecting to any. We will get back to the Court and the government as quick as possible.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Unfortunately I was just informed that we're not going -- because some of our jurors actually went and were picked by Judge Rochon in connection with another trial and some of them are not here. We are not going to be able to reconstitute what we had done. We'll call jurors. We'll put them in the box. We'll put them in the first couple of rows. I basically -- I'll do the two questions initially when they come in, excuse those jurors and then we'll start putting people in the box. And I will start with the voir dire of juror number one. Yes, Mr. Mead.

MR. MEAD: Does the Court want the email we sent the defense?

THE COURT: Sure. That would be great.

MR. DONALDSON: So the 32 that I have here, we can just get rid of those. We are going to start over?

THE COURT: Correct.

MR. MEAD: So the record is clear, I just handed over an email from me from September 23 at approximately 1:18 a.m.

THE COURT: Okay. I'm heartened that everybody is working to wee in hours in the morning. Nothing wrong with a little hard work and elbow grease, although you should also get your sleep. Okay. Thank you.

Any objection to Ms. Disla going across the way indicating to Mr. Letterman that he is excused and bringing however many folks over here who already heard my initial comments over here, and then we'll begin with those folks and see how many hopefully the jurors we can get out of that? Anything we need to do before we do that? MR. DONALDSON: No. Thank you. MR. MEAD: No objection, your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. If we can take a quick break. don't we come back by 10:30 cause I want everybody here as we bring everybody in. Okay. Thank you. We'll stand adjourned. (Adjourned to September 24, 2024 at 9:00 a.m.)